We propose a model in which economic relations and institutions in advanced and less developed economies di er as these societies have access to di erent amounts of information. This lack of information makes it hard to give the right incentives to managers and entrepreneurs. We argue that di erences in the amount of information arise because of the di erences in the scale of activities in rich and poor economies namely, there is too little repetition of similar activities in poor economies, thus insu cient information to set the appropriate standards for rm performance. Our model predicts a number of institutional and structural transformations as the economy a c c u m ulates capital and information.
Introduction
The traditional approach views economic development a s a s e t o f i n terrelated changes ranging from the structure of production to social institutions. In this paper we propose a theory of development based on the evolution of principalagent relations which emphasizes some of the same themes. Even though we are far from providing a unifying theory that can do justice to such a complex phenomenon, our model will generate a host of structural changes in the process of growth. In particular, in our economy, e ciency and productivity will increase, the extent of risk sharing will change, agents will use more sophisticated production techniques and more division of labor, the sectorial composition of output and the degree of specialization in the economy will evolve, and some new nancial institutions will emerge while others disappear. Naturally, our analysis and therefore these results will be extremely stylized, but we will argue, they give some of the avor of the complex process that is development.
Our main argument can be broken into the following steps:
1. Delegation of tasks, employment relations and entrepreneurial activities are important f o r w ealth creation. All of these give a rst-order role to principal-agent relations in the organization of production (see for instance Mokyr, 1991 , North, 1990 , Pollard, 1965 , Stiglitz, 1987 ).
2. Principal-agent relations fail when information is scarce and thrive when information is abundant. In particular, in the absence of adequate information, it is excessively costly to give the right incentives to workers, managers and entrepreneurs (e.g. Holmstrom, 1979 , for a formal analysis).
3. Societies accumulate information about a certain activity b y repeating it, in other words, by allocating some of their scarce resources to this line of business. When a certain activity is repeated many times, the society will have developed a standard for it. This standard can be used by the entrepreneurs to increase their e ciency, o r b y principals to control the entrepreneurs/managers by comparing their performance to this standard. This view is echoed by the historical study of Pollard (1965) who explains that embezzlement and ine ciency were very common among managers at rst, led to high failure rates in mining, textiles and other new industries during the seventeenth century, and were eliminated only slowly over time. In the end, professional management became part of the e cient organization of production. Regarding the importance of setting standards, P ollard writes: \as ever there was considerable di erence b etween the pioneers, ploughing a lone furrow, and those in groups large enough to develop a body of knowledge..." (p. 122). A special case of developing a standard is the use of relative performance evaluation which w e will use as our main example to illustrate how information improves principal-agent relations.
4. In a less developed economy, capital (broadly construed) is scarce, and therefore cannot be allocated in great quantity t o e v ery single activity. The result is lack o f repetition in many areas and thus informational scarcity. As the economy accumulates capital, it will start devoting more resources to a range of activities, and the accumulation of information in each activity will improve the principal-agent relations and productivity.
These steps bring us to our rst main conclusion: prosperity implies more information which implies greater e ciency, and, in turn again, prosperity. This is a process of growth that would be called a \virtuous circle" by Singer (1949) or \circular cumulative causation" by Myrdal (1956) . The mechanism through the accumulation of information and change of incentives is an important, and to date unexplored, alternative to the existing formalization of these ideas (e.g. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989, or Matsuyama, 1994) . What distinguishes our model is not only that we are o ering an alternative microfoundation for \sectorial externalities", but the implications. The improvements principal-agent relations due to information accumulation lead to a n umber of the structural transformations which are not predicted by existing models.
Before discussing the implications of our approach, we outline our formal model. Our economy has many sectors (islands). Production in each sector takes place within rms run by e n trepreneurs (managers) using capital and labor. The output of each rm depends on managerial e ort, an idiosyncratic shock and a sector-speci c shock. The e ort choice of the entrepreneur is her private information, introducing the principal-agent problem in our econ-omy. She can be induced to exert e ort if her compensation depends on her performance. Since all agents are risk-averse, this is costly. As the capital stock increases, more capital will be allocated to di erent activities, enabling the parallel employment o f m o r e e n trepreneurs in each sector. With many entrepreneurs in a sector, average performance can be used as an adequate standard and will lter out sector-speci c shocks ensuring better incentives. As a result, the level of entrepreneurial e ort and the level of productivity will be increasing in the aggregate capital stock of the economy. Since productivity is endogenously lower at earlier stages of development, growth will be slower relative to a pure neoclassical version of our model. Now the implications: a) We nd that as the economy d e v elops and more information is accumulated, there are two opposing forces impacting on the extent o f risk sharing. O n the one hand, more information enables greater risk sharing at a given level of e ort. On the other hand, with more information entrepreneurs are induced to exert more e ort which reduces risk sharing. As a result, risk sharing may decline with development or follow a n i n verse U shape pattern. This result may explain the interesting ndings of Townsend (1995a,b) . In his studies of Asian villages he nds the degree of risk sharing is lower in richer villages \as if consumption insurance, whether indigenous or otherwise, deteriorates with growth" (Townsend, 1995b, p. 95) . We k n o w of no other explanation for this interesting nding. b) Our model predicts that a less developed economy m a y be highly specialized in order to economize on agency costs by i n vesting only in a few sectors. The structure of production will then become more balanced as the economy develops. In particular, when the importance of e ort and the nature of uncertainty v ary across activities, relative production and productivity in the sectors with more agency problems will increase with development. It is a well-known pattern that the share of agriculture is strongly correlated with per capita income, and this is often explained by some sectorial \increasing returns" in manufacturing (Matsuyama, 1991 , see Backus, Kehoe and Kehoe, 1992, for some evidence). Our model o ers a microfoundation for this sectorial increasing returns in manufacturing whereby, e v en though technologically unbiased, growth will favor some sectors at the expense of others.
c) Since Adam Smith, division of labor is seen as an important engine of growth. If the process of production can be separated into smaller or more specialized tasks and delegated to di erent a g e n ts, e ciency can be improved. And yet, with division of labor there is a need to provide the right incentives to the agents working in di erent parts of the production process. Our model shows that as information is accumulated and agency costs decline, production with division of labor (delegation) will become more attractive. The more general prediction is that a developed society should use more \sophisticated" production techniques than less developed economies.
d) Economic development i s t ypically accompanied by urbanization. Bairoch (1988, pp. 246-248), for instance, describes how England (and many other countries) got transformed from an essentially rural society t o a n urban one. Our model enables us to think of another dimension of this transformation. The close-knit structure of villages provides \e cient" direct monitoring of agents, which is certainly related to Townsend's and other researchers' ndings that simple village institutions achieve a high degree of consumption risk sharing. In contrast to villages, monitoring agents in cities is much harder, hence the common notion that cities provide more privacy to individuals. Our model then predicts that at the early stages of development, the close monitoring of villages may be very valuable, but this advantage diminishes as more decentralized information is accumulated, and the right incentives can be given to entrepreneurs in cities without excessive costs. More generally, this reasoning explains a common perception, expressed succinctly by Rosenberg and Bridzell (1985) : \The move to wealth is a move towards greater possibilities of privacy and individual choice" (p. 4).
e) A similar reasoning to (d) also gives us a way of understanding the transformation of nancial arrangements over the process of development. In a classic historical study, Goldsmith (1987) shows that premodern societies had institutions to intermediate funds, but these were quite di erent from what we h a ve t o d a y. I n termediation was local and relied on heavy monitoring. In contrast, today a large fraction of funds are intermediated by stock and bond markets and even the banks which still play a n important role do little monitoring relative to village \usurers" of older times. The same pattern is observed in a cross-section when the nancial institutions of low income economies are compared to their western counterparts (e.g. Besley, 1995) . Again, when there is little information in the economy regarding how a certain business should be conducted, close monitoring is bene cial. As a larger scale of activity increases the amount of decentralized information, di erent institutions become relatively more e cient.
As the discussion suggests, our paper is related to many di erent strands of the literature, and without doing full justice to the insights of some of these. The growth aspect of our model is rather standard. More important for our paper is the structure we borrow from information economics. We model relative performance evaluation using the linear structure rst introduced by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) (from now on H-M, see also the applications in H-M, 1991). Models of relative performance evaluation date back e v en further, for instance, Lazear and Rosen (1981), Holmstrom (1982) , Green and Stokey (1983) and Shleifer (1985) . The key di erences between our paper and these contributions are: (a) the fact that the information is endogenous in our setting and (b) the application of endogenous information accumulation to the process of development.
Other papers closely related to our work are Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Greenwood and Smith (1993) , Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1996,97) , Banerjee and Newman (1993, 96) . Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) , Greenwood and Smith (1993) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1996) discuss issues of nancial development and the last two compare the roles of banks and stock markets. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) explain some patterns of the development p r ocess by exploiting the endogenous risk-return trade-o but does not feature agency problems. Banerjee and Newman (1993) account for the patterns of occupational choice over the process of development using a model of agency. In Banerjee and Newman (1996) they explain the shift of population from villages to cities, based on the assumption that agency costs are less severe in villages than cities. The main di erence between their approach, which also brings back some of the important i n s i g h ts of the older literature on development economics, and ours is that they concentrate on the general equilibrium implications of wealth e ects on the interest rate. In particular, when agents are poor, they have no collateral, and cannot borrow, but with development, these borrowing constraints are relaxed. Since like all previous contributions, accumulation of information is absent in their papers, their mechanism is different but complementary to ours.
The plan of our paper is as follows: section 2 describes the environment a n d characterizes the equilibrium in the absence of imperfect information. Section 3 is the core of the paper. It introduces imperfect information, characterizes the equilibria and determines the impact of capital accumulation on the organization of production and productivity. Section 4 discusses a number of implications of our model. Section 5 concludes and the Appendix contains all the proofs. 
where e h t is e ort, c h t denotes consumption and b h t denotes the funds left for bequest. These funds are invested at the market rate of return, and the returns accrue to the o spring as bequest. Two features are worth noting. First, agents care about the amount of bequest they leave rather than about their ospring's utility (Andreoni, 1989 ). Second, preferences over total wealth exhibit Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA). Each agent has a career choice. He can become either a worker and earn the wage w, or a manager (entrepreneur) and earn the managerial salary z. His total income will then be given as follows:
r t b h t;1 + w t if worker r t b h t;1 + z t if manager where x denotes income, and r t denotes the gross rate of return on savings. We will further assume that capital depreciates upon use, thus r t will also be the net rate of return on savings. Given the separability b e t ween the saving and e ort decisions, utility maximization implies that c h t = ( 1 ; s)x h t and b h t = sx h t , t h us the warm-glove bequests and Cobb-Douglas preferences ensure a constant s a vings rate s which will simplify the dynamics in our model. Within the island, some of the agents will choose to be managers while some others become workers. All islands produce exactly the same good.
Production requires one manager, labor and capital. The amount of nal good produced by r m i in island j at time t, y ijt , i s g i v en by: y ijt = ( + e ijt + a jt ) min h 1 l ijt k 1; ijt i + ijt (3) where l ijt is total labor hired by the rm inclusive of the manager, k ijt is capital, is a constant, e ijt is the e ort exerted by the manager of this rm, a jt is an island speci c productivity s h o c k which a ects all rms on island j, and ijt is an idiosyncratic shock which only a ects this rm. We think of ijt as capturing the importance of luck a s w ell as the role of managerial ability ex-ante unknown to the agents. All productivity s h o c ks are independent from each other and over time, and we h a ve ijt N(0 2 ) a n d a jt N(0 2 ).
The Law of Large Numbers implies (ignoring technical details related to the continuum) that in each period R 1 0 a jt dj = 0 and R 1 0 P i ijt dj = 0 . The form of the production function captures the idea that a manager is necessary for production (\division of labor") and has to exert some e ort but also that there is only a limited amount of capital and labor that the manager can productively use (see also footnote 6 below). Though managers have t o exert e ort, there is no need for workers to exert positive e ort (or equivalently, we could assume that workers also have to exert e ort but they are perfectly monitored).
Capital is owned and supplied competitively b y the agents. As we will see shortly, constant s a vings rate and CARA preferences over the uncertain income process will imply that wealth e ects are absent, thus income distribution among agents does not matter for occupational choices and the dynamics of the aggregate capital stock. Also because capital is perfectly mobile, the distribution of wealth across islands is of no importance. Therefore, the total stock of capital, K t , will be the unique state variable of this economy.
Finally, w e assume that there exists a large set of potential intermediaries, which w e refer to as rms. They can freely decide to enter into any o f t h e islands of this economy and are owned at time t by generation t agents. Each active rm rents capital, labor and one manager for production. Both workers and managers have to be hired from a competitive spot market. We assume that each agent o wns an equal share of all of the rms in the economy. I f a rm makes positive pro ts, these are distributed among the owners, and if it makes a loss, the losses are also distributed among the owners. Since there is no aggregate risk in this economy, a n a g e n t w h o o wns an equal share of all the rms bears no risk. Therefore, all rms will simply maximize expected p r o ts. It is straightforward to see that if we started from a situation in which s o m e agents owned a small subset of the rms and thus faced risks depending on the pro ts of these rms, then there would be Pareto improving trades in shares.
The Equilibrium Concept
Throughout the paper we will use a concept of equilibrium very close to the standard notion of competitive equilibrium, and we will model it as the equilibrium of a two-stage game in the presence of unfettered c ompetition among rms (see Townsend, 1983 ). In the rst stage, potential rms announce in which island, if any, t h e y w i l l b e a c t i v e. If rm i announces at time t that it will be active in island j, w e denote this by i 2 M jt . W e also let M jt #M jt be the number of rms that have announced that they will be active in island j. I n the second stage all i 2 M jt take the rst stage announcements as summarized by M t f M jt g j2 0 1] and the total capital stock of the economy, K t , as given and compete to hire workers and managers from island j and capital from the economy-wide market. We restrict each rm to hire at most one manager. 1 We also use ! t to denote the publicly observed state of nature at time t.
A by o ering a di erent function than w j z j , a n d r, o r b y demanding di erent amounts of labor and capital than l ij and k ij .
2. No rm can change its entry decision in the rst stage and strictly increase its expected pro ts.
3. The resulting allocation is feasible, in the sense that:
4. In every island j 2 0 1], given w j (! t M t K t ) a n d z j (! t M t K t ), M jt agents choose to become managers. 1 We also assume that if a rm announces that it will be active in island j and does not hire a manager, it incurs a small cost . This assumption ensures that in equilibrium only rms which will be active e n ter. 2 An equivalent de nition of equilibrium can be given where all agents would be pure price-takers. This does not a ect our results as long as the space of commodities is chosen appropriately, in particular, insurance contracts need to be allowed, and some incentive compatibility constraint w ould have to be imposed on these when there is imperfect information. Yet another equivalent model would involve managers hiring workers and capital, and writing co-insurance contracts with each other while also respecting incentive compatibility.
5. All managers choose e ort to maximize their utility.
Note in particular that we h a ve already imposed as part of the equilibrium concept that all rms in island j will pay the same (state-contingent) price for labor and managers, and all rms in the economy w i l l p a y the same (statecontingent) price for capital. This is a straightforward implication of competition among rms. 3 Finally, a dynamic equilibrium is simply a sequence of static equilibria linked through bequest decisions.
We will now analyze the equilibrium of the economy under two scenarios:
1. E ort choices of managers are publicly observed (the case of perfect information).
2. E ort choices of managers are not observed by a n y other agent in the economy (the case of imperfect information). In this case rms will have to obey the incentive compatibility constraints of their managers.
Equilibrium With Perfect Information
Since output in this economy will be non-random and markets are complete, risk-neutral rms will pay non-random wages, managerial salaries and interest rates. Therefore, w j (! t M t K t ) = w j (M t K t ), and similarly for z jt and r t .
Moreover, all agents in the same occupation in island j will receive the same payment, and all rms in island j will adopt the same technology and hire the same amount of capital and labor. Further because agents are free to become managers or workers, all agents within an island must be indi erent b e t ween these two occupations. Therefore, z j (M t K t ) = w j (M t K t ) + 1 2 e 2 jt where e jt is the e ort exerted by e a c h manager in island j, a n d z j (M t K t ) is the salary of the manager conditional on exerting the agreed level of e ort, e jt .
Before characterizing the equilibrium occupational choice in each island, we also assume that K t N ; 1; (6) holds at time t. This condition ensures that there is enough capital in the economy at time t so that if this capital is allocated equally across all the islands, at least one rm in each island can be run with productive e ciency, namely adopting a technology such t h a t l jt k 1; jt = 1 8j. When (6) is satised, all rms are run with productive e ciency and fully utilize all of their managerial input. We can now state the following Lemma. 4 Lemma 1 Suppose (6) holds at time t and there i s p erfect information. Then, in equilibrium:
1. e jt = e fb = in all islands 2. the equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that capital is equally allocated across islands (for all j 2 0 1], K jt = K t ). The number of rms (managers) which are active in each island is
All rms hire the same amount of labor and capital: l(K t ) = N Kt 1;
and k(K t ) = Kt N so that l t k 1; t = 1 3. the economy-wide interest rate, and the wage rate and managerial compensation in every island j 2 0 1] are given by:
Lemma 1 establishes a number of results. First, since there is no informational imperfections, managers will agree to exert the rst-best level of e ort, e fb = , w h i c h equates marginal cost to the marginal bene t of higher return (part 1). Second, decreasing returns to capital ensures that the equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that all islands receive the same amount of capital (part 2). Note that from (7), M t is increasing in K t , t h us as the amount of capital in the economy expands, the number of managers ( rms) increases. As a result, development is associated with capital deepening and a growing proportion of the agents who choose the managerial occupation. Finally, although output in any particular island is random, thanks to the large number of islands, total output in this economy is non-random:
Together with the lack of informational imperfection, this ensures that risk-neutral rms can o er full insurance to the factors of production that they hire (part 3). In particular, (8) and (9) state that in equilibrium the expected revenue of each r m net of the additional cost of managerial compensation, + 2 is distributed to capital and labor with shares (1 ; ) a n d . (10) ensures that managers get exactly the same expected return as workers.
Given Lemma 1, equilibrium dynamics are straightforward. Since a fraction s of all earnings are saved, the equilibrium capital stock follows the recursion:
We also assume: s( + ) > N ; 1; (13) This condition { which i s a l w ays satis ed when N is su ciently large { ensures that the steady state level of capital is large enough so that more than one rm per island can be opened, and guarantees that the capital stock of the economy does not fall below a certain lower bound. Then : Proposition 1 Assume that (6) holds at t = 0 , that (13) is satis ed, and that there i s p erfect information. Then, there is a unique equilibrium sequence o f allocations where within every period, the number of rms, wages and managerial salaries in each island, and the interest rate in the economy are given by Lemma 1, and the aggregate capital stock, K t , follows (11) . K t uniformly converges to the unique steady-state capital stock, K ss = s ( + )] 1= N.
The equilibrium dynamics of the economy under perfect information are neoclassical: there is accumulation until a steady state is reached and the rate of return on capital decreases monotonically in the process. Furthermore, given the absence of informational asymmetries, neither the variability o f r e w ards nor the power of incentives change over time. As a result, the behavior of managers and the organization of production are independent of the stage of development.
The Economy With Imperfect Information
We will now assume that the e ort choice of a manager is his private information. This introduces standard moral hazard considerations and implies that the manager should be rewarded conditional upon his performance, and thus will have to receive a random return. We also assume that while the ex-post performance of each individual rm can be costlessly observed, neither the island-speci c (a j ) nor rm-speci c ( ij ) productivity s h o c ks are publicly observed.
We will rst characterize the equilibrium wages, the rate of return to capital, and the form of equilibrium managerial contracts conditional upon the allocation of the capital stock to di erent islands. We will next show that under certain conditions, only a unique symmetric equilibrium will exist, and we will fully characterize the dynamic equilibrium in this case. We will end this section with some comparative static results and a discussion of constrained e ciency.
Static Equilibrium
Let us rst de ne j (! t M t K t ) z j (! t M t K t ) ; w j (! t M t K t ) as the compensation that a manager in island j receives additional to the wage component of his earnings. j will compensate him for the e ort cost and for the risks he takes (in the case of perfect information, we had j = 2 ).
Lemma 2 Suppose (6) holds at time t: Then, in equilibrium:
1. for all j 2 0 1], the number of rms (managers) which are a c t i v e i n island j is given by M j (K jt ) = M jt such that:
jt and
All rms in island j hire the same amount of labor and capital: l jt = l(K jt ) = N (16) where E t is the expectations operator conditional on the public information set of time t.
Part 1 of Lemma 2 is identical to part 2 of Lemma 1, except that under imperfect information the equilibrium does not necessarily have capital equally invested in all islands. Part 2 of Lemma 2, the analogue of part 3 of Lemma 1, states that there is no issue of risk-taking by labor and capital (hence r and w j do not depend on the state of nature ! t ). The large number of islands ensures that there is no aggregate risk, thus risk-neutral rms can once more o er full insurance to the factors for which there is no incentive problem. Therefore, as in the case of perfect information, the expected revenue of rms net of managerial premium will be distributed between capital and labor, again with shares and 1 ; . I n c o n trast to returns to capital and labor, managerial compensation will be random because individual managers will have to bear some risk to provide them with the right incentives. The rest of this section will characterize the contract which determines the managerial compensation.
We start the analysis with two observations. First, since the economy has a linear structure, normally distributed random variables, and CARA utility, we can appeal to the results of H-M (1987) who prove that with this structure and continuous adjustment of e ort levels, the optimal contract is linear. Moreover, thanks to CARA preferences and normally distributed returns, we can simply work with the certainty equivalent of the income process faced by the agents (see also H-M, 1991, for an application). Even though we h a ve so far thought of e ort as chosen once and for all, our structure would carry over unchanged if we considered each period to be a segment o f c o n tinuous time, and managers continuously adjusted their e ort after observing previous performance. Using the result of Holmstrom and Milgrom and this slightly modi ed interpretation of our timing structure, we will restrict attention to linear contracts. Second, we k n o w from standard agency theory that any v ariable which contains information about the e ort level will be useful in giving incentives to the agent (Holmstrom, 1979) . In our economy, a verage output in the island of the manager in question will be a useful variable to condition contracts upon. Average output of island j is correlated with a jt and conditioning on a jt is bene cial because the variability generated by t h i s s h o c k reduces the power of incentive c o n tracts. To see the intuition, imagine that rm i in island j performed very poorly. If all other rms in the island did well, this suggests that the island must have received a favorable shock a n d the bad performance of the manager is likely to have been due to low e ort. In contrast, if all other rms a ected by the same shock also performed badly, i t is likely that the poor performance wa s d u e t o a n a d v erse island speci c shock, not to low e ort.
Let us now drop time subscripts whenever this will cause no confusion. The optimal compensation contract for the manager of rm i in island j will then take the form: 5 
where 0ij ^ 0ij ; w j . Note that the compensation of the manager is made conditional upon the performance of the rm (the term y ij ; ), and the relative performance compared to the average output of all other rms in the same island (the term y ij ;y a j(;i) ). Expressed di erently, (17) will be a type of relative performance evaluation contract which sets the average performance of other agents as the standard relative to which the manager is judged. Quite importantly, a s t h e n umber of rms in island j, M j , increases, y a j(;i) will be more strongly correlated with a jt , and the standard that the society can set will become more accurate.
Next, it can be shown that productive ine ciency is never compatible with equilibrium as long as there are at least two active rms in each island, and thus we will limit our attention to equilibria with productive e ciency (as de ned in section 2.3). Then, the problem of rm i on island j is equivalent to solving the following program: max 0ij 1ii 2ij E y ij ; ij ; w j l j ; rk j j e ij = e ij (18) subject to: e ij = arg max e ij E( ij ) ; 1 2 e 2 ij ; 2 V a r ( ij ) (19) E( ij j e ij ) ; 2 V a r ( ij ) = 1 2 e 2 ij (20) where y ij is given by (3) and ij is as in (17) . (18) is clearly the expected pro t of the rm. The rst condition, (19) , is the incentive compatibility constraint. It requires that the e ort choice of the agent should be the one that maximizes his payo given the managerial contract. Note that we h a ve made use of the fact that the manager will simply maximize the certainty equivalent o f h i s income minus the cost of e ort. (20) is the participation constraint which requires that the certainty equivalent of the additional return (over and above the wage w j ) that the manager receives should exactly compensate him for the cost of e ort. The participation constraint ( 2 0 ) i s necessary and su cient to characterize the equilibrium occupational choices. To see why, recall that there are no wealth e ects, thus if one agent prefers to be a manager rather than a w orker, all agents in the same island would also prefer to become managers irrespective o f t h e i r w ealth level. Therefore, in equilibrium all agents must be indi erent b e t ween the two occupations and (20) ensures this. Also, note that in the objective function (18), we h a ve imposed that each rm takes the price of capital, r, and the price of labor in island j w j , as given. This is to be understood as each rm taking the capital stock of the economy, K t and the rst-stage announcements of all other rms, M t , a s g i v en and anticipating the equilibrium price of capital and the wage rate in island j in the second stage of the entry game (see section 2.2). CARA preferences together with linear contracts simplify the problem, allowing us to proceed in two steps. In particular, because utility is transferable, we can rst maximize the sum of the rm's and the manager's utility with respect to 1ij and 2ij subject to the incentive compatibility of the manager, (19) . Ignoring terms which do not a ect the solution, this maximization problem can be written as:
E(y ij j e ij ) ; 1 2 e 2 ij ; 2 V a r ( ij ) (21) subject to (19) . Next, 0ij can be determined by solving the participation constraint, (20) . The following Lemma establishes three important i n termediate results.
Lemma 3 Under imperfect information:
1. e ort choice of manager i in island j is given as: e ij = ( 1ij + 2ij ) : (22) 2. the average productivity of rm i in island j is: E(y ij j e ij ) = + e ij :
3. the variance of managerial compensation for manager i is given by:
V a r (z ij ) = V a r ( ij ) = This proposition establishes that all rms in island j will choose exactly the same managerial contract and this is uniquely determined for given M j (which itself is a function of K j from (14)) 6 The dependence of both 1j and 2j on M j implies that as the number of rms in island j increases incentive contracts change. Also, since e j = 1j + 2j (Lemma 3), the organization of production { here captured solely by the level of managerial e ort { depends on the number of rms in the island, M j . The comparative statics in section 3.4 will establish that de j dM j > 0. Intuitively, as commented above, when there are more rms, the society can set more a c curate standards this enables a change in managerial contracts and an increase in e ort and productivity. Combining the results of Proposition 2 with those of Lemma 2, we can easily obtain equilibrium factor returns conditional on M t , i.e. on the allocation of capital across islands. We next discuss this allocation.
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Equilibria
In the perfect information case, we established that there could only be a symmetric equilibrium whereby all islands receive the same amount of capital, K jt = K t (and M jt = M t ). With imperfect information, relative performance evaluation and the endogeneity of information introduce an island-speci c externality, and as a result, the equilibrium may i n volve an asymmetric distribution of the total capital stock across the islands. More speci cally, information and incentives improve with the scale of production within an island and this counteracts decreasing returns to capital in the island. In an asymmetric equilibrium, islands which receive a higher (lower) than average amount o f i n vestments have higher (lower) capital to labor ratios, and this depresses (increases) the rate of return to capital. But at the same time, the larger (smaller) number of rms improves (reduces) information and productivity, and this increases (reduces) the rate of return to capital. 6 As we will see in more detail later, this feature implies that when the number of rms is larger in island j information problems are less severe. This may suggest that it could sometimes be pro table to increase the numb e r o f r m s b y sacri cing productive e ciency. However, the form of our production function (3) precludes this possibility. What matters is not the number of other rms producing in the same island, but total production. M j appears in our expressions because when all rms are run with productive e ciency, total output is proportional to M j . This also explains the particular form of the production function chosen. Lemma 
Lemma 4 9 such that, for all K t satisfying (6), 8
, there exists a unique equilibrium which is symmetric.
We can see the intuition for this lemma a s f o l l o ws. is the amount o f output each rm produces irrespective of the e ort level of the manager. The allocation which maximizes the number of rms in the economy has capital allocated equally across islands. Thus, is the opportunity c o s t o f a l l o c a t i n g capital asymmetrically (i.e. of reducing the number of rms in the economy). As a consequence, when is large, the opportunity cost of an asymmetric distribution of capital is prohibitively high, and there only exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Dynamics of Symmetric Equilibria
Since asymmetric equilibria are complicated and of only indirect interest for the focus of this paper, in this section we will fully characterize only the dynamics of accumulation and development with symmetric equilibria. We will discuss asymmetric equilibria in section 4.6.
In the case of a symmetric equilibrium, managers in all islands will receive exactly the same contract, 0jt = 0 (K t ) 1jt = 1 (K t ) 2jt = 2 (K t ), where 0 (K t ) 1 (K t ) a n d 2 (K t ) are given by Proposition 2 and simply depend on K t since in a symmetric equilibrium M jt = N K 1; t . F urthermore, given Proposition 2, all rms in the economy adopt the same technology, a n d w orkers in di erent islands receive the same wage.
Since a fraction s of all income is saved, the law of motion of capital with symmetric equilibria can be written as:
t : (27) We can summarize our ndings in (proof in the text):
Proposition 3 Assume that the conditions of Lemma 4 and condition (6) are satis ed. Then, given K t , there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium allocation at time t: In this equilibrium M jt = N K 1;
all managers sign contract (17) with 0 (K t ) 1 (K t ) and 2 (K t ) as given by Proposition 2, and choose e ort level as in (22) . Factor prices are:
The evolution of the physical capital stock is given by (27) .
This proposition establishes that in the dynamic equilibrium of our economy, capital accumulation is accompanied by an increase in the number of rms and more repetition. The information that is accumulated as a result of this process enables the society to set better standards, and improves the e ort level of managers and total factor productivity. T h us, the interaction of endogenous information and incentives creates a form of \scale externality". Because total factor productivity m a y be increasing in the capital stock o ver a certain range, dynamics are no longer purely neoclassical, and multiple interior stable steady states cannot be ruled out in general (though it can be established that for su ciently large, the steady state is unique).
Remark We h a ve so far talked of islands. For some of our applications an economy consisting of di erent sectors may be more appropriate. To start with, our results would apply exactly to an economy where there is a c o n tinuum of sectors, each agent has a strong comparative a d v antage for one sector and the output of di erent sectors are perfect substitutes. A more realistic formulation would involve di erent sectors producing imperfect substitutes. In this case, aggregate consumption could be dened as a composite of di erent sectors' output, e.g. c t = exp h R 1 0 c jt dj i , and agents could be homogeneous and decide which sector to work in. This setup { which w as analyzed in a previous version of this paper { gives similar results, but the analysis is more involved due to \Jensen's inequality" terms in aggregation.
Some Comparative Statics
Equations (24) and (25) lead to a number of interesting comparative static results. Straightforward di erentiation establishes:
First, when 2 increases, both 1 and 2 decrease, and e ort and productivity fall. To understand this result, recall that in this economy it is precisely idiosyncratic variability w h i c h m a k es it costly to induce e ort. If 2 = 0 , managerial contracts would specify 1 = 0 a n d 2 = 1, and provided that there are at least two rms in the island, managers would bear no risk, and the rst-best would be implemented. Idiosyncratic variability i n troduces noise to the signal coming from the individual performance and makes managerial compensation random. Since managers are risk-averse, this lack of full insurance is costly, and managerial contracts trade o insurance and incentives. As 2 increases, lack of insurance becomes more costly, and there is lower e ort in equilibrium. Second, when 2 increases, 1 falls and 2 increases because with more island speci c variability, relative standards become more informative. Overall, the change in 2 dominates and the net e ect is that the level of e ort and productivity increase with the volatility of island-speci c shocks. Third, as the number of rms grows (as a result of capital accumulation), the standards improve, and again there is more of relative and less of absolute performance evaluation (higher 2 and lower 1 ). Once more the e ect through 2 dominates, and we h a ve de dM > 0, thus accumulation of information (and capital) leads to higher managerial e ort and productivity. This contrasts with the economy with perfect information where there was no interaction between incentives and development.
Agency Costs and Development
Agency costs are the costs incurred by the society due to the imperfect information in principal-agent relations. In our model these have t wo components: (i) managers exert less e ort in the economy with asymmetric information than in the rst best and (ii) they require a risk-premium to be compensated for the variability in their income. We capture both components with our concept of T A C (K), total agency costs that the society incurs per rm:
where e and V a r ( ) depend on M(K), 1 (K) a n d 2 (K) via equations (14), (22) and (23), and this makes T A Cdepend on K. The rst term of (30) is the e ort component and the second is the loss of utility in certainty e q u i v alent terms due to the risk borne by the managers. Another useful concept is SAC(e K ) ( shadow agency cost) w h i c h is given by the certainty equivalent of income that is foregone in order for managers to be induced to exert the e ort level e (as di erent from the optimal level of e ort, e ). Formally:
SAC(e K ) min This proposition establishes that more information is always useful in our setting as it enables better incentives and risk sharing. Therefore, the cost of more e ort at the margin and the total loss of utility due to incentive problems are decreasing in the amount of information, and thus in the total capital stock of the economy.
Constrained E ciency
We h a ve established that as the economy d e v elops, it achieves higher levels of e ort and productivity. Can a social planner subject to the same technological and informational constraints ensure a more e cient outcome? To a n s w er this question, we analyze the static problem of a planner maximizing the sum of the utility of all agents in the economy without any distributional concern. 7 We start with three simple observations. First, as in the decentralized economy, a s long as there is enough capital to open at least two rms with productive eciency in every island, the planner would never choose productive ine ciency.
Second, given our assumptions, the planner will also choose linear contracts. Finally, the planner will o er the same contracts to all managers in the same island. Then, the planning problem can be written as: M j e 2 j dj (32) subject to the incentive compatibility of the managers, (19) , and the resource constraint (14) , with V a r ( j ) g i v en by (23 and induces e s j = e j for all j 2 0 1] as given by equations (22), (24) and (25) .
The proposition states that conditional on the allocation of capital across islands, the planner would choose the same allocation as the decentralized economy, or in other words, she would choose exactly the same contracts and induce the same level of e ort. Although there are many externalities at work, the contracts that result from decentralized competition are e cient. To understand the intuition of this result, rst note that the e ort level of a manager does not create an externality on other managers in the same island. Given the additive structure of (3), as long as he exerts the e ort level he is expected to (a requirement i n a n y pure strategy equilibrium), the signal extraction problem faced by all other rms is una ected. This can also be seen in equations (24) and (25) where the power of incentives given to the manager only depends on the total amount of production (or equivalently, o n the number of rms) in the same island.
Despite the fact that contract choices are e cient, the allocation of capital across islands chosen by the planner does not necessarily coincide with the equilibrium. More speci cally, it is straightforward to show, along the lines of Lemma 4, that if is su ciently large (say greater than S ), the planner will choose a symmetric equilibrium. Therefore, when is larger than both and S , the unique symmetric equilibrium that we c haracterized above is also the constrained e cient allocation. However, it is not possible to establish unambiguously how S compares to . Intuitively, when a rm decides to locate in island j rather than j 0 it ignores two externalities it is creating: workers in island j will be better o and those in island j 0 will be worse o because labor demand and wages will increase in island j and decrease in island j 0 . These two e ects do not always cancel out in the equilibrium, hence the distribution of capital across islands is not necessarily e cient. Moreover, it is useful to note at this stage that many of the applications we will consider in the next section features technologies or sectors with di erent degrees of agency costs, and in these situations, the decentralized equilibrium is more likely to be ine cient.
Applications

Risk Sharing
Since workers and capital owners bear no risk, the extent of risk sharing in our economy is captured by the variance of managerial returns V a r ( (M(K) 1 (K) 2 (K))). This is a component of total agency cost (see (30) ) analyzed in the previous section. However, although T A C (K) decreases with accumulation, this is not necessarily true for the variance. That is, the degree of risk sharing may b e non-monotonic or even decreasing with development. Intuitively, a s M (i.e. K) increases, shadow agency cost, SAC(e K ), falls but in the mean time, the equilibrium level of e ort e also increases, and this requires managers to bear more risk. This interaction between two opposing forces determines how t h e v ariability of managerial returns will change over the development process. Proposition 6 shows that the link between risk sharing and growth depends on the degree of risk-aversion and on the amount of noise that contractual arrangements are subject to. For instance, if agents have a l o w degree of risk-aversion (small ) o r t h e v ariance of the shocks is small, then, as more information becomes available, risk sharing will improve. The opposite occurs when the degree of risk aversion (or the idiosyncratic variability, 2 ) i s high. In this case, because incentives are very low p o wered, the variability o f managerial returns is very low in poor economies, and increases over time. In intermediate cases, the variance is non-monotonic, and risk sharing increases rst, and decreases afterwards. Even though only managers bear risks in our economy, the opposing forces impacting on risk sharing will apply more generally to all agents bearing risks due informational problems.
The possibility that risk sharing is decreasing with accumulation (case 3), or inverse U-shaped (case 2), provides an interesting interpretation to some recent empirical evidence. It is often argued that less developed economies su er from serious agency problems (see for instance, North, 1990 ). However, Townsend (1994 Townsend ( , 1995a and other recent studies (as reviewed by Morduch, 1995) have shown that in Asian villages there is relatively low v ariance of consumption, thus quite good risk sharing arrangements. Moreover, Townsend (1995b) nds that risk sharing appears to be lower in richer villages. It is tempting to interpret these recent ndings as evidence that less developed economies do not in fact su er serious incentive problems, and that growth and modernization may be the factors destroying the \e cient" organization of small communities and villages. Our model provides an alternative i n terpretation to these ndings whereby i n l e s s d e v eloped economies, the organization of production is highly ine cient because shadow agency costs are prohibitively high. As the scale of economic activity g r o ws, more information becomes available, and more sophisticated contractual arrangements can be devised. Because these contracts induce higher e ort, the extent of observed risk sharing may decline. Possibly at even later stages of development, t h e v ariability of managerial and entrepreneurial returns may again start falling as relative performance evaluation becomes more powerful.
A related feature worth noting is that our model also has implications about the distribution of (labor) income. Income distribution is determined by the choice of e ort by managers and the variability of managerial returns. In cases 2 and 3 of Proposition 6, growth is \unequalizing" in less developed economies because it leads to an increase in managerial e ort and higher variability o f managerial incomes, and therefore to a greater di erence between the average income of managers and workers. In case 2, however, as capital accumulates further, the variability of managerial returns will decrease, and this will reduce both the observed dispersion among entrepreneurs and the risk-premium that managers are paid over workers. If the decline in risk-premia dominates the increased compensation for higher e ort, growth will bring about a more equal distribution of income in advanced economies. Therefore, our model with intermediate levels of risk aversion is consistent with the Kuznets curve.
Sectorial Transformations
Sectors typically di er in terms of the structure of uncertainty they face as well as their technology. This will imply that agency problems will be more serious in certain sectors than others. When the scale of production is limited, there will be very little information to be used in agency relations, and sectors where agency matters more will have relatively lower productivity. As a result, capital accumulation will be accompanied by sectorial transformation towards activities where agency problems are more important. Even though this insight may h a ve a n umber of potential applications, in this section we will consider the implications of our model for how the share of agriculture in total production evolves over the process of development.
As discussed above, the variance of idiosyncratic shocks relative t o t h e v ariance of common shocks are crucial for the extent of agency costs. Now suppose, not implausibly, that agriculture is subject to large common shocks due to weather, while the variation due to idiosyncratic uncertainty (or managerial talent) are more important in industry (manufacturing). This assumption is in accord with the empirical evidence provided by P ollard (1965) who documents the very high failure rates of managerial rms during the seventeenth and eighteenth century Britain, and attributes most of this to managerial mistakes or negligence, and with Townsend (1995b) who reports that individuals involved in entrepreneurial activities su er more volatile consumption than farmers. L e t u s n o w d e v elop a very simple version of this sectorial transformation story by making three strong assumptions: (i) There are two goods. We think of the rst as an agricultural and the second as a manufacturing (industrial) product. Half of the islands can only produce agricultural goods and the other half can only produce industrial goods. On each island j 2 0 1] there are N agents which can only work in agriculture, while on each island j 2 1 2] there are N agents which can only produce industrial goods.
(ii) Agricultural and industrial products are perfect substitutes. (iii) The variance of idiosyncratic shocks in agriculture is 2 A = 0 and the variance for the idiosyncratic shocks in manufacturing is 2 I > 0: Thus, agency problems are absent in \agriculture". 8 However, note that since 2 A > 0, agricultural output may be subject to more variability than manufacturing.
The technology is essentially the same as in the one-sector economy. A l l rms have a quasi-Leontie technology like (3). Workers cannot move across islands but can invest their wealth in a balanced portfolio of all the rms in the economy, t h us will bear no risk. Since in equilibrium all rms are run under productive e ciency, w e h a ve: over, managerial contracts in agriculture z A (or A ) will di er from managerial contracts in industry z I (or I ) because of the di erences in the structure of uncertainty. Consequently, managerial e ort in agriculture, e A will di er from managerial e ort in industry, e I . In particular, since the return to agricultural rms within each island are perfectly correlated, the rst-best e ort level can be implemented in agriculture, that is e A = Z and V a r (z A ) = 0 : Instead, industrial contracts will induce the e ort level e I = ( 1 + 2 ) with 1 and 2 given by (24) and (25) . Note that the contract in the industrial sector will be conditional on the information { thus, the number of rms { in the industrial islands. 8 All three assumptions can be relaxed. For instance, islands can be allowed to choose whether to specialize in agriculture or industry. Instead of perfect, the two g o o d s m a y b e imperfect substitutes with elasticity of substitution greater than one, and this would also enable us to match the relative price movements over the development process, but again is not crucial for our argument. Also, k I (36) where the second equality of (36) follows from de ning T A C I as the total agency costs in industry analogously to (30) . Since capital is perfectly mobile, the return to this factor will be equalized across all islands, therefore, we m ust have r I = r A which implies: k A increases. Therefore, there is faster capital deepening in industry than in agriculture. As a result, the shares of industrial production over total production and the share of expenditure in industrial goods over total expenditure also grow with development. Additionally, productivity a n d w ages also increase in industry but remain constant in agriculture. As a result, economic growth in the presence of imperfect information is endogenously sector-biased, despite the fact that technical progress is neutral across the two sectors. This is consistent a v ery salient pattern in the development process of almost all countries: at the early stages of development, a large fraction of resources are allocated to agriculture, and as the economy g r o ws, more resources are transferred to industry. T h i s pattern of development is usually explained by assuming that the potential for productivity growth is much higher in manufacturing than in agriculture due to some \sectorial externalities" (e.g. Matsuyama, 1991) . Our mechanism can therefore be viewed as suggesting a microfoundation for these externalities.
From Villages to Cities
In the model discussed in the previous subsection, by construction, the share of total employment in agriculture remained constant. This feature is easy to change, and the model has interesting implications about migration from \rural villages" to \industrial cities", another salient pattern of economic development. To do this, we i n troduce an additional factor of production, say land, which is immobile. In contrast to previous sections, we n o w assume that labor can move freely between islands, and agents can choose in which island to work. The interpretation of the model can also be modi ed to t this example. Agricultural islands have l o w agency costs not only because of the di erent structure of uncertainty (as in the previous subsection), but also because of the way villages are organized: the close-knit communities lead to tight peer group monitoring. In contrast, the privacy and anonymity in cities do not allow easy direct monitoring, hence principal-agent relations have t o use decentralized information and incentive c o n tracts to induce e ort. This point is also emphasized by Banerjee and Newman (1996) who obtain migration from villages to cities as a result of borrowing constraints becoming less severe.
To model these issues, let us modify the Leontie part of the technology in both agricultural and industrial have to: min h 1l l k (1; q; l ) i instead of min h 1 l k (1; ) i (where q is land). In this case, both the rate of return to capital and wages will be equalized across islands, but the rental rate on land will not be.
The formal argument i s v ery similar to that used to analyze the two factor case. Now, with labor perfectly mobile, wages and the rate of return on capital will be equalized across islands, and this implies:
where l A (k A ) a n d l I (k I ) denote labor (capital) employed by agricultural and industrial rms, respectively. F rom (38), it follows that:
Capital accumulation implies an increasing number of rms and decreasing agency costs in industry. Then, from (40), l I l A and k I k A have t o g r o w. This implies that the number of rms in industry relative to agriculture, M I M A is growing. Therefore, total employment in agriculture is declining and agents must be migrating from villages to cities. The reason for this transformation is again related to our main mechanism: villages provide direct peer-monitoring thus reduce agency costs (i.e. without informational problems, there would be no migration). At the early stages of development, this is a very important resource and a large fraction of the population lives in villages, even though productivity i s l o wer there (partly endogenously because there is excessive capital and labor in these islands). As more capital and information are accumulated, cities take a d v antage of reduced agency costs and expand. Finally, note that during the process of industrial expansion and migration, the productivity of capital and labor in agriculture is also increasing because fewer workers and capital are working with the same amount of land.
Direct Monitoring and Financial Development
At all stages of development, specialized nancial institutions intermediate funds from savers to rms. However, there are very important di erences between the institutions in poor economy and those in a more developed society. In his historical study Goldsmith (1987) nds that in most pre-modern societies funds are provided by direct lending institutions such as usurers, or local intermediaries, or at best, local banks. This contrasts with the larger banks, stock and bond markets of more developed economies. A crucial di erence concerns the degree of direct monitoring carried out by di erent nancial institutions (see Diamond, 1984 , on the monitoring role of nancial intermediaries).
In this section, we assume that there are two t ypes of nancial intermediaries, with free entry into each t ype. First, in each island there exist local credit institutions which w e will call village intermediaries (VI). These intermediaries collect funds from savers in the whole economy at some market rate r, but can only lend to rms located in their own island. 9 A VI can perfectly monitor the e ort of the local managers that they nance. The cost of providing these intermediation/monitoring services is c per rm. For simplicity, w e assume that monitoring takes place interim and is publicly observed. This implies that a VI monitors all the managers it lends to before their nal performance is revealed (more realistic assumptions, for instance, stochastic monitoring would not change the results). Second, there are some global intermediaries (GI) w h i c h o er their service at some lower cost, but cannot monitor (for instance, they lack the local expertise). For simplicity, and without loss of any generality, w e assume that the cost of providing these services is zero. We can think of these GIs as of banks which operate at the economy-wide scale, or, alternatively, w e can think that rms can raise their funds through a stock market (see Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1996 , for a more detailed analysis of these di erent institutions in a model with moral hazard problems). The important assumption here is that, in the absence of informational imperfections, intermediation through GI is more e cient t h a n i n termediation through VI. W e also assume that the performance of rms which receive funds via VIs are observed by rms run through GI, and this assumption rules out potential coordination problem.
Clearly, the comparative a d v antage of local intermediation and monitoring declines as the scale of economic activity expands and more information is revealed by the activity of rms in the economy. W e can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 7 LetK be such that T A C (K) = c. Then, for all K t K intermediation is provided by \village intermediaries", while for all K t K intermediation is provided by \global intermediaries". This result is consistent with the empirical evidence that local nancial institutions are predominant in poor economies and decline as development proceeds (see Besley, 1995 , Fry, 1995 , Goldsmith, 1987 . Intuitively, VIs d o not need decentralized information since they carry out direct monitoring.
Therefore, as more information is accumulated, global intermediaries become relatively more attractive. Note also that even though our simple model predicts an abrupt switch from local to global intermediation, the analysis could be easily extended to yield a smoother transition.
Division of Labor
Division of labor is a complex phenomenon, and di erent approaches concentrate on di erent aspects of this process. An important aspect of the division of labor is the delegation of tasks to agents who are not residual claimants of the returns they generate. In our economy, the most important f o r m o f delegation is to have managers running rms. In this extension we s h o w that in poor economies where information is scarce, production techniques that do not rely on principal-agent relationships will have a comparative a d v antage and the extent of division of labor will be limited. This view is in line with a simple reading of historical patterns. During the First Industrial Revolution rms were predominantly family-managed, and this managerial structure is still dominant i n m a n y developing economies. More recently, especially starting with the Second Industrial Revolution, complex hierarchical organizations have emerged and played an important role in production and distribution (see Pollard, 1965 , Chandler, 1977 .
We analyze the issue of division of labor with a very simple extension model. We refer to our benchmark technology of production as the factory production (FP). The alternative i s primitive production (PP) which e n tails no delegation of tasks to a manager. Output of unit i in island j using PP is given as:
ijt l ijt i + ijt (41) Since with PP there is no \ xed cost" of production, the number of rms using PP is indeterminate. However, to facilitate the discussion and without loss of generality, w e impose that for all i j, l ijt k 1; ijt = 1 , s o t h a t w e can still talk of the \number of rms".
We n o w assume that 2 ( 2 ; T A C 1 2 ; T A C 1 ) w h e r e T A C m is the total agency cost incurred with factory production when there are m rms in the island. This assumption ensures that when there are very few rms, PP is preferred to FP. I n c o n trast, when there are su ciently many rms so that the society can set accurate standards, agency costs are low and division of labor (FP) is preferred to PP. This is because, when there are m active r m s i n the island, each rm with FP generates a certainty equivalent of income equal to + 2 ; T A C m whereas with PP, each rm produces a certainty e q u i v alent of income equal to + . It is now clear that we can state an analogue of Proposition 7 whereby for all capital stocks less than some critical levelK, the economy does not make use of division of labor, and when K > K, all production takes place with FP.K in this case is given by T A C (K) = 2 ; .
Note also that at the point when the economy switches from PP to division of labor, there is an increase in the level of productivity per rm from + to + e (K) (where e (K) ; e (K) 2 2 ; 2 V a r ( (K)) = ).
It is useful to emphasize that in our economy the switch from primitive production to division of labor is not due to the fact that division of labor is more capital intensive b u t t h a t i t i s m o r e information intensive. In other words, in the absence of informational imperfections, if PP was preferred to FP at some capital level K 0 , i t w ould be preferred at all other capital levels too. Hence, loosely speaking, the division of labor in our economy is limited by the extent of information: when the economy has more capital, and thus more information, agency costs decline and division of labor becomes relatively more attractive.
The analysis of the last two subsections also suggests a more general principal. If more \sophisticated" products or production techniques are at the same time more \information intensive", because monitoring is harder or because they involve more delegation, then as a society develops, the range of products will expand, the production methods will be become more re ned and there will be more delegation of tasks. With all of these changes, as in our division of labor example, the productivity will often increase.
Development and Specialization
Less developed economies are typically highly specialized and invest a large share of their resources in only a few narrow sectors. This is consistent with our model when we view islands as sectors. In particular, the analysis of section 3 showed that asymmetric equilibria are possible with imperfect information, even though with perfect information, only symmetric equilibria can exist.
Asymmetric equilibria correspond to the economy being specialized in a few activities at the expense of the rest. The reason is to economize on agency costs by generating information in some selected sectors.
To get more insights into development and specialization, we can consider a simple diagrammatic exposition of asymmetric equilibria. Figure 1 draws r j (K j ), the rate of return to capital in island j if an amount of capital K j is invested in that island (thus with M(K j ) a c t i v e rms). It is straightforward to see that if this schedule is downward sloping everywhere, there can be no asymmetric equilibria, and our condition in Lemma 4, that > ensures this. Suppose instead that < and r j (K j ) is increasing over a certain range. Let us now concentrate on asymmetric equilibrium in which a fraction of islands have capital K 2 and the remaining 1 ; have K 1 < K 2 , a n d K 2 (K 1 K 2 ) so that not all islands can have capital equal to K 2 . It is straightforward to see that K 1 and K 2 must be as drawn in Figure 1 . In particular, note that no island will have a capital stock equal to K 0 because r j (K j ) is increasing around K 0 , t h us if an additional rm opened in this island, it would make positive pro ts. Then, an asymmetric equilibrium is characterized as follows:
x K 1 and K 2 as in Figure 1 , then compute: 10
That is the fraction of islands with more capital is determined in order to have the capital demand equal the aggregate stock of capital. It is now c l e a r that conditional on K 1 and K 2 , a smaller aggregate stock of capital implies that the economy i s v ery specialized. For instance, thinking of the islands as sectors, this would correspond to an economy w h i c h i n vests a large fraction of its resources in a small fraction of the sectors. As the economy becomes richer and K increases, (K) increases too, and the economy becomes less specialized. Therefore, our model predicts that poorer societies tend to be more specialized as a way of economizing on agency costs.
Conclusion
This paper o ers a theory of development where principal-agent relations play a crucial role. Wealth is generated by delegating tasks to agents who are not the residual claimants of the returns they generate. When the control of these agents is costly, productivity i s l o w. We argue that the amount of decentralized information the society generates is a crucial determinant o f h o w easy it is to control the agents. In turn, the structure of information depends on the scale of production. When more agents are engaged in the same activity, the society will develop a better standard for this activity, and this will enable relative performance evaluation. Therefore, as a society accumulates more capital, it will also accumulate more information. This will lead to higher managerial e ort and productivity. As well as explain why the process of development m a y b e s l o w, our theory has a number of important implications, reminding us of the older theories of development with their emphasis on structural transformation. We n d that the extent of risk sharing will change with development, the sectorial composition of output will shift, there will be more division of labor, there will be less reason for close-knit village communities to survive, and nancial institutions will be transformed. Approaching some of the same problems as our paper with a somewhat di erent emphasis, Besley (1995, p.121) writes that \(local institutions and enforcement)... do seem in general do disappear as capital markets develop. This re ects the fact that monitoring and other technologies improve in the development process. ... Whether a symptom or a c ause, the decline of this type of non-market institution in the development process vividly illustrates the idea that they use certain information structures and enforcement technologies that are e r oded by the transformation to a modern economy." In terms of Besley's quotation, we are arguing that the relative decline of a host of institutions and sectors is a consequence of information accumulation and development, but also that such structural transformations have important implications regarding the range of products, organization of rms and productivity. Our list is not even close to being exhaustive of the transformations on the way from poverty to prosperity. It is also not exhaustive o f t h e d e v elopment implications of changing principal-agent relations. Our model is su ciently simple and tractable that more results can be obtained by modifying certain aspects of the baseline speci cation. However, we hope the implications we draw g i v e the avor of what can be done. We also hope that our model suggests other approaches to the same problem: more information will improve agency relations not only via better relative performance evaluation but also through alternative uses of information. Some of the implications will be similar while others will di er. As di erent testable implications are derived from these approaches and are confronted with data, our understanding of the development process will improve. Now using the facts that y j = + e j , e j = and that the equilibrium must be symmetric, w e obtain (8), (9) and (10) . This concludes the proof of Lemma 1. QED Proof of Proposition 1: By assumption K 0 N ; 1; . Then condition (6) ensures that if K t is in the right n e i g h borhood of N ; 1; , K t+1 > K t . N e x t , given (7), K t+1 is an increasing and strictly concave function of K t and since M t N, w e h a ve K t s( + )N. Therefore, there exists a unique steady state level of K t K ss . Since K t+1 is a strictly concave function, this unique steady state is also globally stable.
To c haracterize the steady state value K ss , n o t e t h a t K ss = s( + )M(K ss ): Then using (7) gives the expression of K ss in the proposition. The rest of the Proposition follows immediately from the analysis discussed in the text. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2 : Part 1. The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 1 part 2, except for the symmetry argument.
Part 2. Since rms are risk-neutral, by a standard argument, they will o er a non-random return to the factors of production for which there are no incentive compatibility constraints. Therefore, the rates of return to labor and capital are non-random. The exact expressions for these rates of return, (15) and (16) 
Solving the two rst-order conditions gives 1ij = 1j and 2ij = 2j as in (24) and (25) . To n d 0ij = 0j , w e use the participation constraint, (20) , and the facts that e ij = 1j + 2j (from Lemma 3) and E( j e ij ) = 0j (from (17)). QED.
Proof of Lemma 4 . Let us de ne the rate of return to capital in island j when a total amount o f c a p i t a l K j is invested there, the labor market clears, rms choose the optimal contracts and make zero pro ts as: A necessary condition for asymmetric equilibrium is that there exist two levels of capital, K j 0 K j 00 , s u c h t h a t r j 0(K j 0 ) = r j 00(K j 00 ). Therefore, a su cient condition for the equilibrium to be unique and symmetric is that r 0 j (K j ) < 0 for all K j . We will now p r o ve that for su ciently large this is always the case. To see this note that: (i) the rst term on the RHS of (45), (1 ; ) N K j is decreasing in K j (ii) the second term of (45), (K j ) (1 ; ) ( 1 (K j ) + 2 (K j )) ; 0 (K j )] N K j does not depend on (iii) from (24) , (25) and (14) it follows that 9B u such that for any K j > 0, d (K j ) dK j < B u < 1. Then, 9 such t h a t 8
we h a ve t h a t r 0 j (K j ) < 0, and there exists a unique equilibrium whereby 8j 2 0 1], K j = K (capital is equally distributed across islands). QED.
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that 1 and 2 are chosen to maximize (21) subject to (19) . Given the de nition of TAC from (30) , this is equivalent to the unconstrained maximization of + 2 ; T A C (K) with respect to 1 and 2 . N o w recall from Lemma 3 that e = ( 1 + 2 ) a n d V a r ( ) = h ( 1 + 2 ) 2 Di erentiating this with respect to K and once more using the envelope theorem, we h a ve SAC 2 (e K ) < 0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5. Conditional upon M t , 1j and 2 j are given by the rst-order conditions of (32) once e j is substituted from (19) . Straightforward di erentiation leads to (24) and (25) exactly as in the decentralized equilibrium. QED Proof of Proposition 6. F rom (23), (24) and (25) Proof of Proposition 7. First, consider K t <K as de ned in the proposition. We will show that all intermediation is through VIs is the unique equilibrium. Suppose all intermediation through VIs. In this case, free entry ensures that active r m s w h i c h are using VIs m a k e zero pro t, i.e. + 2 ; c = w V I (K t )l(K t ) + r V I k(K t ), where w V I and r V I are the equilibrium factor returns when there is only intermediation through VI. N o w, consider a deviation from a rm which decides to use GI instead of VI. The pro t of this rm will be + 2 ; T A C (K t ) ;w V I (K t )l(K t ) ;r V I k(K t ) = c;T A C (K t ) < 0, since T A C (K t ) > T A C (K) = c. Hence, intermediation through VIs i s a n e q u ilibrium. We then show that in the same case (K t K ) a l l i n termediation through GIs is not an equilibrium. Assume it is, then free entry in the rststage game ensures that active r m s w h i c h are using GIs make zero pro t, i.e. + 2 ; T A C (K t ) = w GI (K t )l(K t ) ; r GI k(K t ). Now, consider a deviation from a rm which decides to use VI instead of GI. The pro t of this rm will be + 2 ; c ; w GI (K t )l(K t ) ; r GI k(K t ) = T A C (K t ) ; c > 0. This establishes that there exists a pro table deviation, therefore intermediation through GIs is not an equilibrium. A similar argument w ould show that no equilibrium in which some rms use GIs and some others use VIs can exist. Thus, with K t <K, i n termediation through VIs is the unique equilibrium.
Next consider K t >K. In this case, the reverse of the previous argument applies exactly, and this establishes that only intermediation through GIs i s an equilibrium. QED
